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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Workmen's Compensation - Hearsay Evidence - Doctor's
Opinion. The Washington court, in Liljeblom v. Department of Labor
& Indust.,1' strictly applied rules of evidence to defeat a widow's
pension suit. The court held, in a five-four decision that admission of
a physician's written report in a superior court review of the board of
industrial insurance appeals' order was prejudicial error since the re-
port was hearsay. The admission sought was part of an examination
report jointly filed by two doctors. The other half had been submitted
at the board hearing by the department.
The court had the following record before it. The claimant's hus-
band alleged to the department of labor and industries2 that he had
been injured in an industrial accident on March 2, 1955. On June 28,
1955, at the request of the departments Liljeblom was examined by
Doctors Ralph H. Huff and John M. Steele. Their joint report was
filed with the department. A- further examination of Liljeblom was
requested by the department and conducted by two other physicians.
Only the report by Dr. Steele was favorable to Liljeblom's claim,
and the supervisor' entered an order rejecting his claim on October 11,
1955. Timely appeal was made to the board of industrial insurance
appeals. Joel A. Liljeblom died on November 4, 1955. On March 25,
1957, the board entered an order dismissing the appeal' without preju-
dice to his widow's right to file her claim under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.'
The widow filed a claim with the supervisor, which was rejected,
and appeal was made to the board. At the hearing, claimant presented
her own testimony, the testimony her husband had given at the hearing
during his lifetime, and the testimony of Dr. F. W. Hennings. Dr.
Steele was not called as a witness, nor was his former testimony offered.
On cross-examination of Dr. Huff, claimant attempted to introduce the
entire report, including Dr. Steele's portion. This was rejected as
.1 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 356 P.2d 307 (1960).
2 RCW 51.28.020 provides that a workman shall file application for compensation in
order to receive it under Title 51, the Workmen's Compensation Act.
s RCW 51.32.110: "Any workman entitled to receive compensation under this title
shall, if requested by the department, submit himself for medical examination .... If
the workman refuses to submit to any such examination, or obstructs the same, his
rights to monthly payments shall be suspended until such examination has taken
place... :'
4RCW 51.04.020: "The director shall: ... (3) Regulate the proof of accident and
extent thereof.. ..5 in re Liljeblom, Wash. State Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals (1957).
O RCW 51.32.050 (2) : 'If the workman leaves a widow ... a monthly payment of
one hundred dollars shall be made throughout the life of the surviving spouse... ?'
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hearsay. The board entered an order denying the claim and sustaining
the supervisor's order.'
The claimant appealed8 the decision to superior court for review.'
The trial court admitted as evidence both parts of the joint report of
Drs. Huff and Steele and overruled the objection to their admissi-
bility.'
The department appealed.1' Error was assigned to the admission of
the report and the overruling of objections to certain portions of Dr.
Huff's testimony. 2
The supreme court summarily disposed of claimant's contention
that the exhibit should be admitted for impeachment purposes on the
ground that impeachment cannot be accomplished by showing that
another doctor had a different opinion. 3
The court then faced claimant's contention that the report was
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act. 4 The act provides that "A record
of an act, condition or event shall.., be competent... if, in the opinion
of the court, the sources of information, method and time of prepara-
tion were such as to justify its admission."" The court relied on Young
v. Liddington,6 for the proposition that an opinion does not fall within
the scope of "act, condition or event."'" The rationale in Young was
that the act was adopted to avoid the necessity of calling numerous
witnesses who may have had a part in creating such records. The
7 Liljeblom v. Department of Labor-& Indus., Wash. State Bd. of Indus. Ins. Ap-
peals (1957).
8 Under RCW 51.52.110 both the claimant and the employer have standing to appeal
the Board's order to a superior court.
9 RCW 51.52.115: "Upon appeals to the superior court only such issues of law or
fact may be raised as were properly included in the notice of appeal to the board, or in
the complete record of the proceedings before the board. The hearing in the superior
court shall be de novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or testimony other
than, or in addition to, that offered before the board or included in the record filed by
the board...."
10 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 33-34, 356 P.2d 307, 309-10 (1960).
11 RCW 51.52.140 provides for appeal from the judgment of the superior court as in
other civil cases.
12 Brief for Appellant, p. 14, Liljeblom v. Department of Labor & Indus., 157 Wash.
Dec. 30, 356 P.2d 307 (1960).
13 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 35, 356 P.2d 307, 310 (1960).
14 RCW 5.45.
15 RCW 5.45.020.
16 50 Wn.2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957), noted, 33 WAsH. L. REv. 158 (1958). Plain-
tiff in a malpractice suit offered, and trial court received in evidence, a record stating
the doctor's opinion as to the cause of the patient's condition. Held, a medical opinion
as to causation not the result of an observed act, condition or event, cannot be estab-
lished by a business record. The court used the same reasoning in Trompeter v. United
Ins. Co., 51 Wn.2d 133, 316 P.2d 455 (1957) to preclude the admission of plaintiff's
employer's discharge slip as evidence of lack of disability.
17 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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records are permitted for the truth and accuracy of accounts then
present and contemporaneously recorded. They must be the routine
product of a clerical system and while hospital records may be ad-
missible under the act, they must meet the standards required of other
business records. Therefore, the rule permitting admission of opinion
evidence, the nature of which other persons qualified to make the same
record might have differed, was not adopted. The court in Young then
discussed the physician's opinion therein considered as being based on
speculation and conjecture.
Judge Foster, dissenting, analyzed Young differently:
The physician's opinion appearing in the hospital chart in Young v.
Liddington,... was held incompetent because it was not sufficiently
probative to be admissible. Such was the sole reason for exclusion. It
was not held that records containing opinions must be excluded. Had
that been the decision, [sic] I would not have signed it. The question
here was completely absent in Young v. Liddington,... which the court
cites as support for its position.I8
The law pertaining to admission of written reports of doctors in
accident cases is still in a state of evolution. The earlier development
of the doctrine of the admissibility of business records stemmed from
a recognition of the procedures of persons using shop-books. The con-
cept of "regular entries" developed, tending to cause rigidity when the
doctrine was first applied to matters of irregular occurrence such as
doctor's reports. More recently the courts have recognized that the
rising standards of the medical profession indicate the special relia-
bility upon which the rule is based. For example, in Korte v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R.,19 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held admissible a doctor's letter to the railroad which had retained him,
as a business record made in the course of the doctor's business. Judge
Clark there stated that the Federal Business Records Act20 was not to
be "interpreted in a dryly technical way, contrary to ordinary habits
and customs, to reduce sharply its obvious usefulness."'" However,
some courts limit by their definition of "regular course of business"
the application of business records acts.22 The trend of the decisions
has been analyzed by Professor McCormick as follows:
Is 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 41, 356 P2d 307, 314 (1960).
10 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1951), noted, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 290 (1952) ; 5 VAlD. L. Rnv.
651 (1952). See White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
21 Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 191 F2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1951).22 E.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Zapt, 192 Md. 403, 64 A.2d 139 (1949). (The
Maryland court excluded the X-ray report of a physician specializing in radiography
1961]
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Accordingly, well-reasoned modern decisions have admitted in accident
cases the written reports of doctors of their findings from an examina-
tion of the injured party, when it appears that it is the doctor's pro-
fessional routine or duty to make such report.
23
The Washington court in the instant case was faced with the prob-
lem of balancing the importance of the report to the claimant against
the probability of its bias and lack of probative value. The balance
when struck by the court swung to inadmissibility. This practically
requires proffer of the physician's testimony so as to make it subject
to cross examination. A substitute for this safeguard is found in Lilje-
blom. The department itself retained the physicians and was the force
creating the report which the claimant desired to introduce.24 Thus, it
would seem that these circumstances attest to the report's veracity and
lack of bias. Further, this same information could have been intro-
duced by other means.2 5
The court disposed of the argument that an agency relationship
existed between the department and Dr. Steele, by relying on Leschner
v. Department of Labor & Indus."0 It is submitted that the analysis in
Leschner" is not applicable in the instant case. There the issue was
whether a physician who failed to file a claim for the workman was an
agent of the department. In the present case, as distinguished from
Leschner, the physician was not retained by the injured workman for
treatment, but one selected by the department for the required physical
as not being a memorandum occurring in the regular course of business, nor was it a
mere hospital or nursing record.)
23 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 287 (1954). This analysis was presented by the dis-
sent. 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 43-44, 356 P.2d 307, 315 (1960).
24 See statute quoted note 3 supra.
25 WASn. RULES, PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, 26-32 pertaining to the use of
depositions. Further, in this case claimant did not specifically offer Dr. Steele's evi-
dence to the board of industrial insurance appeals at the hearing. In the future Rule
43.16W would be applicable to this type of situation: "If the judge finds a witness at
a former trial or proceeding to be unavailable as a witness within the conditions set
forth in Rule 26(d) (3) governing the use of depositions, the testimony of such witness
on the former occasion shall be admitted for use as testimony in a trial or proceeding
involving substantially the same matter when... (2) the testimony is offered against
a party against whom, or against whose predecessor in interest, it was offered on the
former occasion." Adopted Nov. 2, 1960, eff. Jan. 2, 1961. This would apply to the
Board through its Rule 5.10(d) making applicable the rules of the superior courts of
the state.
2627 Wn.2d 911, 185 P.2d 113 (1947).
27 In Leschner v. Department of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911, 922, 185 P.2d 113,
119-20 (1947) the court said: "If the attending physician selected by the injured
workman were to be deemed an agent of the department, we would be presented with
the anomalous situation wherein one whose claim is against the industrial insurance
fund appoints an involuntary agent for the state .... whose actions bind it with respect
to claims upon that fund. In our opinion, the act intends, rather, that the injured
workman become the patient of the physician.... Consequently, we hold that Dr. Dodds
was not the agent of, and was not representing, the department of labor and industries
when he told the respondent that he had already sent in the claim."
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examination." The question of an agency relationship for reasons of
technical administrative filing provisions is not in question. Here the
relationship is one in which Dr. Steele was retained for the specific
purpose of rendering the report in question to the department. Thus,
it would seem that Leschner reasoning would not apply.
Judge Foster contended that:
The workman submitted because the statute compelled him to do so,
and now the court reverses a judgment for his surviving widow be-
cause the report of such examination was admitted in evidence when
offered by his widow.
Dr. Steele's report to the department was not hearsay, so there is no
occasion to consider the exception to the hearsay rule contained in the
uniform business records as evidence act. It was made directly to the
department by Dr. Steele who had been employed by the department
for that specific purpose.29
The court in this case construed away the legislative intent of RCW
51.52.115 which provides in part: "The proceedings in every such
appeal shall be informal and summary, but full opportunity to be
heard shall be had before judgment is pronounced...." This was
accomplished by looking to RCW 51.52.020 granting the board pro-
cedural rule-making power and to the board's rule of procedure
5.10(d) applying the rules applicable to the superior courts."0
Perhaps the best test to be applied in these cases is this: on which
party is it most equitable to place the burden of obtaining the physi-
cian's direct testimony? Under the analysis of Liljeblom it falls on
the claimant if the claimant wishes to use it in his behalf. This allows
the department to selectively present only those reports favorable to
the department after having forced the injured workman to submit to
examination. Would it be unfair to require the department to refute
the physician's report, if it desires, by obtaining his direct testimony?
It is submitted that there should be a legislative re-evaluation of the
pertinent sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act3e ' which the
28 See statute quoted, note 3 supra.
29 157 Wash. Dec. 30, 40-41, 356 P2d 307, 314 (1960).
30RCW 51.52.020: "The board may make rules and regulations concerning its
functions and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law until altered,
repealed, or set aside by the board ... . Rules of Procedure 5.10(d) of the board
regarding appeals provides: "The officer presiding at the hearing will on objection or
on his own motion exclude all irrelevant or unduly repetitious evidence. In ruling upon
objections to the competency of evidence and in disposing of appeals from such rulings,
due account will be taken of the requirement that hearings be informal, in the appli-
cation of the rules applicable in the superior courts of this state." RCW 51.52.140:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the practice in civil cases shall apply to
appeals prescribed in this chapter .... "
3, RCW 51, especially RCW 51.52.020.
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court applied in retreating from the "informal and summary"'" pro-
ceedings provision of the act. In the alternative the board's present
exemption from important provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act"8 should be examined." Until this reevaluation is accomplished
the practitioner will need to introduce testimony, in workmen's com-
pensation proceedings, within the narrow confines of a legalistic frame-
work as opposed to the informal framework desired by the legislature.8 "
ROBERT DEBRUYN
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Real Estate Broker Held Liable in Damages for Unauthorized
Practice of Law. In Washington the problem' presented by individuals
engaging in an unauthorized practice of law' traditionally has been
dealt with by utilizing one of three alternative forms of redress. Those
forms are: prosecution for a misdemeanor; bringing an equitable
action to enjoin such conduct; and the exercise of the inherent power
of the court to punish such conduct as contempt.8 The recent case of
Mattieligh v. Poe4 has added a new weapon to the arsenal which can
32 RCW 51.52.115.8
'RCW 34.04.
84 RCW 34.04.150: "The provisions of RCW 34.04.090 through 34.04.130 shall not
apply to the board of industrial insurance appeals...." RCW 34.04.100 provides in
part: "Agencies or their authorized agents, may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the coduct of their affairs."
35 See generally, Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals after Nine
Years: A Partial Evaluation, 33 WASH. L. REv. 80 (1958).
1 Although the specific reasons for classifying it a problem may vary with individual
writers the general theme is that such unauthorized practice increases the possibility
of harm resulting to the public. "Persons who are not licensed to practice law are
usually incompetent to practice. Incompetent practice often causes harm to the public.
Therefore, practice by unlicensed persons may often cause harm to the public, and
should be prevented." Offenbacker, Unauthorized Practice in Washington, 30 WASH.
L. REv. 249, 250 (1955). A slightly different approach has been taken on the basis of
the Canons of Professional Ethics. "It would be useless to establish high standards of
morality for members of the profession if those who are not members, and therefore
not bound by such canons, could practice the arts of the profession." Adler, Unauthor-
ized Practice: A Continuing Campaign in the Public Interest, 44 A.B.A.J. 649 (1958).
Another strong motivation on the part of the Bar to eliminate the unauthorized prac-
titioner is seldom discussed, that is the threat that such unauthorized practice presents
to the monetary interests of the authorized practitioners.
2 It is beyond the scope of this Casenote to adequately define those actions which
constitute an unauthorized practice of law in Washington. For additional information
as to that aspect see, Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors,
41 Wn.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952), and Offenbacker, Unauthorized Practice in Wash-
ington, 30 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1955). There are several law review articles relating
to the attempts by other jurisdictions to define unauthorized practice, but in the
Washington State Bar Ass'n case the Washington Supreme Court specifically refused
to cite other jurisdictions for their definitions of unauthorized practice because of the
great diversity in their respective definitions.
8 These three forms of redress are referred to in RCW 2.48.180 and in In re McCal-
lum, 186 Wash. 312, 315-16, 57 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1936).
4 157 Wash. Dec. 95, 356 P.2d 328 (1960).
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